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UR-0.47
River stage one • 2 direct dependents • 3 total dependents
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/ UR::Context::Transaction
Security Advisories (12)
CVE-2018-14041 (2018-07-13)

In Bootstrap before 4.1.2, XSS is possible in the data-target property of scrollspy.

CVE-2018-14042 (2018-07-13)

In Bootstrap before 4.1.2, XSS is possible in the data-container property of tooltip.

CVE-2020-11022 (2020-04-29)

In jQuery versions greater than or equal to 1.2 and before 3.5.0, passing HTML from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code. This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

CVE-2020-11023 (2020-04-29)

In jQuery versions greater than or equal to 1.0.3 and before 3.5.0, passing HTML containing <option> elements from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code. This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

CVE-2019-11358 (2019-04-20)

jQuery before 3.4.0, as used in Drupal, Backdrop CMS, and other products, mishandles jQuery.extend(true, {}, ...) because of Object.prototype pollution. If an unsanitized source object contained an enumerable __proto__ property, it could extend the native Object.prototype.

CVE-2015-9251 (2018-01-18)

jQuery before 3.0.0 is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks when a cross-domain Ajax request is performed without the dataType option, causing text/javascript responses to be executed.

CVE-2011-4969 (2013-03-08)

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in jQuery before 1.6.3, when using location.hash to select elements, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted tag.

CVE-2012-6708 (2018-01-18)

jQuery before 1.9.0 is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks. The jQuery(strInput) function does not differentiate selectors from HTML in a reliable fashion. In vulnerable versions, jQuery determined whether the input was HTML by looking for the '<' character anywhere in the string, giving attackers more flexibility when attempting to construct a malicious payload. In fixed versions, jQuery only deems the input to be HTML if it explicitly starts with the '<' character, limiting exploitability only to attackers who can control the beginning of a string, which is far less common.

CVE-2020-7656 (2020-05-19)

jquery prior to 1.9.0 allows Cross-site Scripting attacks via the load method. The load method fails to recognize and remove "<script>" HTML tags that contain a whitespace character, i.e: "</script >", which results in the enclosed script logic to be executed.

CVE-2019-5428

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

CVE-2014-6071 (2018-01-16)

jQuery 1.4.2 allows remote attackers to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via vectors related to use of the text method inside after.

CVE-2018-14040 (2018-07-13)

Prototype Pollution is a vulnerability affecting JavaScript. Prototype Pollution refers to the ability to inject properties into existing JavaScript language construct prototypes, such as objects. JavaScript allows all Object attributes to be altered, including their magical attributes such as _proto_, constructor and prototype. An attacker manipulates these attributes to overwrite, or pollute, a JavaScript application object prototype of the base object by injecting other values. Properties on the Object.prototype are then inherited by all the JavaScript objects through the prototype chain. When that happens, this leads to either denial of service by triggering JavaScript exceptions, or it tampers with the application source code to force the code path that the attacker injects, thereby leading to remote code execution.

NAME

UR::Context::Transaction - API for software transactions

SYNOPSIS

my $o = Some::Obj->create(foo => 1);
print "o's foo is ",$o->foo,"\n";  # prints 1

my $t = UR::Context::Transaction->begin();

$o->foo(4);

print "In transaction, o's foo is ",$o->foo,"\n";  # prints 4

if (&should_we_commit()) {
    $t->commit();
    print "Transaction committed, o's foo is ",$o->foo,"\n";  # prints 4

} else {
    $t->rollback();
    print "Transaction rollback, o's foo is ",$o->foo,"\n";  # prints 1
}

DESCRIPTION

UR::Context::Transaction instances represent in-memory transactions as a diff of the contents of the object cache in the Process context. Transactions are nestable. Their instances exist in the object cache and are subject to the same scoping rules as other UR-based objects, meaning that they do not disappear mearly because the lexical variable they're assigned to goes out of scope. They must be explicitly disposed of via the commit or rollback methods.

INHERITANCE

UR::Context::Transaction is a subclass of UR::Context

CONSTRUCTOR

begin
$t = UR::Context::Transaction->begin();

Creates a new software transaction context to track changes to UR-based objects. As all activity to objects occurs in some kind of transaction context, the newly created transaction exists within whatever context was current before the call to begin().

$t = UR::Context::Transaction->begin(commit_validator => sub { ... });

A validation function may be assigned with the commit_validator property. When the transaction is committed, this function is called. The commit proceeds if this function returns a true value. The default function, changes_can_be_saved requires that all objects changed within the transaction be valid, ie. that $obj-__errors__()> returns an empty list. The validation function is passed one argument: the transaction object being committed.

METHODS

commit
$t->commit();

Causes all objects with changes to save those changes back to the underlying context.

If the validation function (specified with the commit_validator param when the transaction was created with begin()) returns false, the changes are not committed to the encompassing context, commit() returns false and this transaction remains in effect.

Returns true if all the transaction's changes are committed to the encompassing Context. This transaction object then becomes invalid, and its state will be 'committed'.

rollback
$t->rollback();

Causes all objects with changes to have those changes reverted to their state when the transaction began. Classes with properties whose meta-property is_transactional => 0 are not tracked within a transaction and will not be reverted.

After rollback(), this transaction becomes invalid, and the object will become a UR::DeletedRef.

delete
$t->delete();

delete() is a synomym for rollback

has_changes
$bool = $t->has_changes();

Returns true if any UR-based objects have changes within the transaction.

get_changes
@changes = $t->get_changes();

Return a list or UR::Change objects representing changes within the transaction.

CLASS METHODS

eval
UR::Context::Transaction::eval BLOCK

Executes the BLOCK (with no arguments) wrapped by a software transaction and a CORE::eval. If the BLOCK dies then the exception is caught and the software transaction is rolled back.

do
UR::Context::Transaction::do BLOCK

Executes the BLOCK (with no arguments) wrapped by a software transaction and a CORE::eval. If the BLOCK returns a true value and does not die then the software transaction is committed. If the BLOCK returns false or dies then the software transaction is rolled back.

If the BLOCK throws an exception, it will be caught, the software transaction rolled back, and the exception will be re-thrown with die().

EXPORTS

This module can export constants that match the valid values of the state property: TRANSACTION_STATE_OPEN and TRANSACTION_STATE_COMMITTED

SEE ALSO

UR::Context